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The Earth and the Portrait: A Comparison of Dostoevsky’s  
Alyosha Karamazov and Prince Myshkin
Callaghan McDonough
In his major novels, Fyodor Dostoevsky sought to manifest the consequences of certain ideologies—mainly Christianity and atheism—in narrative form. In 1868, Dostoevsky published 
The Idiot, with the intent of “[depicting] the positively good man,” a sort 
of perfect imitation of Christ incarnated in modern Russian society (qtd. 
in Knapp 154). As his writing progressed, Dostoevsky soon discovered—in 
Myshkin’s ultimate moral failure—that “there is nothing more difficult than 
[this pursuit] in the world, especially nowadays” (154). Dostoevsky felt 
that he had not expressed “even a tenth” of what he had intended (qtd. in 
Miller 22). Twelve years later, Dostoevsky published his magnum opus, The 
Brothers Karamazov, partly as a second attempt at creating a “positively good 
man” in the character of Alyosha. This time he succeeded; Alyosha became 
what Myshkin failed to be. 
But it can be difficult to see why. How is it that of these two men, 
each with the loftiest of intentions and each confronting the same world of 
suffering, Alyosha’s story ends in a spiritual victory, while Myshkin’s ends 
in spiritual squalor? A close analysis reveals that Alyosha embraces reality 
and becomes a triumphant Christ figure, rising figuratively above death. In 
contrast, Myshkin pursues an artistic reflection of reality and never exits the 
tomb.
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I. The First Crossroads: The Inner Person 
In Dostoevsky’s imaginative world, the narrative Christ figure must 
confront evil. When any author constructs a Christ figure, equally powerful 
forces of antagonism must also be introduced. For just as the biblical Christ 
goes to war against evil and death, so must imitations of Christ battle imita-
tions of these same enemies. In both The Brothers Karamazov and The Idiot, 
Alyosha and Myshkin wrestle with grim manifestations of evil; first, howev-
er, they struggle in the abstract. Having just emerged from relative isolation, 
Alyosha and Myshkin enter society and are forced to engage the philosophi-
cal problem of evil. This intellectual challenge foreshadows what is to come 
in embodied form. For each character’s response to abstract suffering reveals 
the manner in which each will later engage actual suffering. 
In The Brothers Karamazov, Alyosha’s brother Ivan provides the 
most explicit atheistic perspective in the novel, and his argument for athe-
ism—in the form of the problem of evil—acts as an abstract antagonist to 
Alyosha’s faith. In its basic form, the problem of evil posits that an omnipo-
tent, omniscient, omnibenevolent being cannot coexist with evil. Evil clearly 
exists; therefore, God does not exist. Ivan Karamazov’s formulation of this 
argument is addressed in the following question:
Imagine that you yourself are building the edifice of 
human destiny with the goal of making people happy in 
the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but for that 
it was necessary and unavoidable to torture just one tiny 
little creation, [a] little child who [is] beating herself on 
the chest with her little fist, and found this edifice on 
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her unavenged tears, would you agree to be the architect 
under such conditions…? (213)
In other words, a loving God would not create a world in which even one 
child is tortured and killed, regardless of any further ends to be accom-
plished. If God does exist, Ivan argues, he has created a world of suffer-
ing that can never be truly “redeemed,” for no amount of vengeance, hell, 
forgiveness, or even future happiness can blot out the earthly suffering of 
children, who endure agony for the sake of their irresponsible Creator’s plan 
(212). This irresponsible Creator—whether or not he exists—is a being 
unworthy of worship. Ivan’s visceral and intellectually thorough “rebellion” 
(204)—of which this episode is only a segment—was, in Dostoevsky’s own 
words, a more “powerful…expression of…ideas from the atheistic point of 
view” than any ever seen in Europe (Notebooks, qtd. in The Brothers Karama-
zov 667). Much of its power comes from the fact that Dostoevsky construct-
ed his case for atheism using actual historical accounts of child abuse from 
trials he had read about and attended, producing an effect that has struck 
many as being potent enough to topple any defense of the divine (209). 
Alyosha’s response, however—delivered immediately—suggests that 
there is a theodicy that can withstand Ivan’s intellectual arsenal: “You said 
just now, is there a being in the whole world who would have the right to 
forgive and could forgive? But there is a Being and He can forgive every-
thing, all and for all, because He gave His innocent blood for all and every-
thing” (Brothers 213). Whether or not this is a sufficient response to Ivan is 
beyond the scope of this essay, but Alyosha’s offering of this response reveals 
something fundamental about his character. As he is intimately acquainted 
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with sickness and poverty by this point, Alyosha possesses a raw understand-
ing of the problem of evil. For him, the problem of evil is not simply an 
idea, a conflict confined to the mind; it is far more holistic. For this reason, 
Alyosha points to Christ, understanding him as a being—a living, incarnate 
person. Furthermore, rather than focusing upon Christ’s teaching, Alyosha 
focuses upon Christ’s life and death upon the cross. While on earth, Christ 
was one who cradled lepers, wept with the mourning, and ultimately under-
went crucifixion; he knew suffering and resurrection. Following his redemp-
tive sacrifice for humankind, Christ promised to be as spiritually present in 
humankind’s pain as he was while on earth. As Ivan draws his theoretical 
argument from historical accounts of suffering, Alyosha responds with what 
he believes to be a historical account of healing, one that continues to be 
present. Unlike an abstract theodicy, Alyosha’s “Being” is a living person, 
active amidst suffering and responsive to the needs of the weeping child. For 
Alyosha, suffering is not something that can be explained away with a the-
odicy; it must be tangibly alleviated through human action. This incarnate 
response stands in contrast to an abstract reflection of existence. As such, 
whether or not Alyosha provides an adequate response to the problem of 
evil, his human response reveals the direction he himself has chosen. 
In The Idiot, the problem of evil arrives through a different medi-
um, that of Hans Holbein’s painting, The Body of the Dead Christ in the 
Tomb. Ippolit Terentyev, who fills Ivan Karamazov’s role as an advocate of 
atheism, describes the painting’s emaciated, scarred Christ, his pallor grey, 
his empty eyes rolling back into his head, saying that “one has the impres-
sion of nature as some enormous, implacable, dumb beast,” a “vast modern 
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machine which has pointlessly seized, dismembered, and devoured, in its 
blind and insensible fashion, a great and priceless being, a being worth all of 
nature and all her laws” (430). In his art criticism, Ippolit voices the athe-
ist response to evil; this argument acts an abstract antagonist to Myshkin’s 
faith. Unlike Ivan’s rebellion, Ippolit rejects God not because of the absurd 
foundation of humankind’s ultimate harmony, but because of the absurd 
reality of its ultimate destruction. A nail entering the wrist of an inno-
cent man is definitive and purely physical; no space exists in the painting’s 
frame for an omni-benevolent, omniscient, omnipotent Artist. In Ippolit’s 
interpretation, Holbein depicts Christ’s death as senseless, thoughtless, and 
impersonal. When a person’s life ends—particularly in a horrific manner—
this defies any possibility of an all-good, all-powerful God and any possibil-
ity of resurrection for humankind. In the overwhelming presence of death, 
it seems impossible that God is able—or even desires—to continue human-
kind’s existence beyond this earth. Therefore, the Artist of this life must be 
indifferent Nature alone. Death, not God, splashes the final black hue of 
paint. Christ remains in the tomb. 
While Alyosha presents a response to Ivan, Myshkin mutely faces 
Ippolit’s challenge. Indeed, in his own examination of Holbein’s painting, 
his only comment is, “A man could lose his faith looking at that picture!” 
(Idiot 229). In Platonic terms, while Ivan’s formulation of the problem of 
evil—being based on historical accounts—is once-removed from reality, 
Ippolit’s formulation results from a painting and is thus twice-removed from 
reality. Thus, when Myshkin engages suffering here, he is—epistemologi-
cally—a lengthy distance away from real suffering. Alyosha is much closer, 
49THE OSWALD REVIEW / 2019
yet he evinces no fear of “[losing] his faith.” How can a mere image dispel 
a man’s core beliefs? This question becomes more pressing as one observes 
Myshkin’s frequent and exuberant assertions of commitment to Orthodox 
Christianity (231, 574-5). In these moments, Myshkin appears to staunchly 
hold his beliefs to the point of dogmatism. However, when asked directly 
about his personal faith, Myshkin is evasive (229, 402). Why can Myshkin 
pontificate about Christianity one moment, but cannot provide a defense 
when his beliefs are challenged? How can his dogmatic faith be undermined 
by paint on a canvas? 
When one more closely analyzes Myshkin’s orations, the answer 
becomes evident. Myshkin speaks of the “concept of God,” the “idea of 
Christ,” “Our Christ” (Idiot 231, 575). He presents Christ as an idea (a 
specifically “Russian” idea), an image, a word that can be spoken, or a ban-
ner that one waves above one’s troops. While Alyosha portrays Christ as a 
three-dimensional, living “Being” who can be personally known, Myshkin 
provides no evidence of belief in an actual God; he sees a two-dimensional 
image of Christ (213). For this reason, Holbein’s painting is enough to 
topple his faith; an image displaces an image. Why is this the case? Just as 
Myshkin’s cherished beliefs are two-dimensional, so is his inner existence; 
he lacks the kind of experiential self-knowledge required for spiritual depth. 
Thus, when confronted by questions of his own being, he possesses no 
response. These questions concern his reality, and Myshkin’s mind—freshly 
removed from a Swiss asylum—is still dwelling in the abstract. Unlike 
Alyosha, who—in response to Ivan—moves from abstract ideas to the gritty 
reality of the world, specifically in his complex family relations, Myshkin’s 
50 MCDONOUGH 
mind remains fixated upon an imagined, artistic reflection of the world. 
These internal changes—or lack thereof—provide the first inklings of each 
man’s approaching fate.   
II. The Second Crossroads: The Other 
The next major crossroads for each protagonist concerns the Other. 
Each has begun to choose how he will conceptually view the world; now, 
each must decide how he will view other people—specifically, certain beau-
tiful women in his life. Alyosha’s and Myshkin’s interactions with particular 
women provide the clearest glimpse into their moral characters, revealing 
their incarnate solidity or “excarnate” vacuity (cf. Taylor 556).
Alyosha’s father and brothers, in describing the woman Grushen-
ka—for whom they romantically compete—fashion a glamorized caricature. 
She becomes a kind of sexualized goddess in the imagination of young Alyo-
sha. Continuing the destructive family pattern, Alyosha willfully resolves 
to wield her as a weapon in his own rebellion against God, following the 
death of Father Zosima, Alyosha’s mentor. With Grushenka—in a black silk 
dress—“nestling” like a “kitten” on his lap, Alyosha’s glossy imaginings have 
come to life (300). The Karamazov (“black smear”) has awoken within Alyo-
sha, and he plans to indulge it, succumbing to the image. In other words, 
Alyosha plans to engage in a sexual act with Grushenka, but one that defies 
recognition of the act’s self-giving, other-honoring element; it is intended to 
be angry, egocentric, and degrading.
But in this “critical moment,” Alyosha allows his expectations to 
be upended by reality and, as a result, he comes to a deeper understanding 
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of the Other (Brothers 291, cf. Weil 65). Faced with the actual embodied 
person of Grushenka, Alyosha discerns her kindness and cannot commit 
the act that his father would; the surname’s dominion is limited, and the 
“Alyosha” (“defender of man”) has risen in defense. For the woman before 
him is exactly that—a woman!—a three-dimensional human person with 
her own hopes, fears, insecurities, and imperfections. She is not a possession 
or a conquest or a painting, but a “treasure” (302). The curtain of lust and 
prejudice is thus torn in two, and Alyosha perceives a “sister” sitting on his 
knee (305).
In perceiving the reality of another—a selfless pursuit of under-
standing—Alyosha draws Grushenka into his manner of seeing. In her 
designs, he, too, had been a conquest—a projection of judgmental purity to 
be defiled (Brothers 301). Alyosha was to be her rebellion, not against God, 
but against the other Karamazov men, who seek to control her, and Alyosha, 
who she believes has judged her (304). 
But Alyosha’s attention prompts reciprocation. Her remorse 
upon learning of Zosima’s death, followed by her leaping from his knee in 
shame, displays authenticity, not manipulation. Something remarkable has 
occurred, and it is a turning point for both characters, but especially for 
Alyosha. With the subsequent forming of a relationship—the two becom-
ing siblings in suffering—each is drawn from their shadowy projections into 
a very earthbound intimacy. In becoming proximate to each other—and 
truly attending to each other—object becomes person, and person becomes 
family. Alyosha has learned to move from abstraction to reality, appearance 
to being. In his previous fear of evil, Alyosha had hidden behind monastery 
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walls; now he emerges from within the monastery of his own mind. He 
expected to find “treasure” only in those like Zosima: the “saints” (Brothers 
302). In his interaction with Grushenka, however, he learns that beauty and 
goodness can be found even in one who shoulders the societal yoke of “sin-
ner.” Alyosha discovers that when he embraces others’ embodied realities—
in this case, quite literally—he may find the joy of a mutually-redeeming 
relationship. 
But where Alyosha succeeds, Myshkin fails. As Myshkin becomes 
further entrenched in Russian society, the face of Christ is not the only 
image vying for his devotion. He is also confronted by the portrait of the 
breathtaking Nastasya. Myshkin’s strange, impulsive response to his first 
viewing of this image—the kiss—cannot be over-emphasized (Idiot 85). 
In Myshkin’s kiss on the canvas, he pledges himself to the fictional image. 
Why does Myshkin kiss the portrait but gaze in stupefaction at the actual 
woman? The answer is simple: for Myshkin, the portrait is—in almost every 
sense—the woman. Myshkin’s enraptured gaze rests on a two-dimensional 
projection. 
Indeed, Myshkin—“afraid to look at [women]”—never truly does 
(Idiot 82). Throughout the novel, Nastasya’s actual behavior conflicts with 
the beauty of her portrait, and Myshkin is unable to reconcile the difference 
(124). Seeing a created image, he imposes this created image on the actual 
person. As a result, Myshkin is voluntarily blind to Nastasya’s reality. “In 
you everything is perfection…no one would wish to see you different,” he 
tells her, a statement that—while flattering—is far from the truth (148). 
Nastasya is not the only victim of Myshkin’s blindness. Aglaya, too, is one 
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wondrous “portrait” that he sees “as an object a mile away from where he is” 
(364). Existing at a permanent distance from the knowledge of Aglaya’s and 
Nastasya’s actual natures—their intricacies, flaws, and desires—Myshkin 
objectifies and idealizes them. Unlike Alyosha, who develops a proxi-
mate and physical connection to a fully-realized, flesh-and-blood woman, 
Myshkin sees women as installations in an art gallery. 
Myshkin’s inability to see women as persons is ultimately the result 
of fear. As Myshkin says, he is afraid to look at Aglaya’s face (Idiot 82), and 
he says, “I cannot bear Nastasya Filippovna’s face…I’m afraid of her face!” 
(616-7). He much prefers to gaze upon the women’s portraits than to meet 
their eyes, as he fears the intimacy of an actual relationship. For this reason, 
he objectifies Nastasya and Aglaya, seeing them as portraits even when he is 
with them. He would prefer not to discover their imperfections through a 
relationship; rather, if they can remain “stopping points,” colorful idols with 
a manufactured façade of perfection, he can continue to worship them—
from a safe distance (Marion 10-11). Just as he replaced Christ with an 
image, so he does with women. 
For this is Myshkin’s desire: to worship his idea of each woman, or 
more specifically, each woman’s beauty. Myshkin is profoundly moved by 
beauty; it has the power of salvation over him (Idiot 402). Rowan Williams 
calls Myshkin a “man with no history” (51). Myshkin does possess a history, 
however; it is simply a history of alienation. In Russian society, he remains 
as much an “outcast” from the “chorus” of life as he was in the Swiss asy-
lum; thus, he is seeking an entry point into the world (Idiot 446). “Beauty” 
becomes this entry point. But when Myshkin sees Nastasya or Aglaya, he 
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experiences a feeling, and he calls this “beauty.” When he pursues beauty, he 
is—in actuality—pursuing the feeling that results from seeing the woman; 
he is not pursuing the woman herself. As a result, he loves like a “disembod-
ied spirit,” a ghost worshiping a mirage (617). He can kiss Nastasya’s two-
dimensional portrait—and later, Aglaya’s love letter—but never the three-
dimensional woman (85, 380). Each kiss is an attempt to be swallowed up 
by beauty, to achieve a “profound experience of infinite happiness” (238). 
But what he truly needs and desires is an intimate relationship. While Alyo-
sha is willing to be “spiritually completed by others” through a relationship 
(Wyman 177), Myshkin is indecisive, unable to commit to either Aglaya or 
Nastasya; he tells Yevgeni Pavlovich that he wants to love them both (Idiot 
617). Both women are tortured by this lack of commitment. Myshkin, how-
ever, does not recognize his fault, for how does one commit to a picture? 
As before, Myshkin is longing to escape his dreamlike reality, but he 
continues to doggedly chase dreams. He longs to be “saved by beauty,” but 
his beauty is not salvific or an antidote to alienation (Idiot 402). Perceiving 
human beings as pictures imprisons him in a kind of solipsism, surrounded 
by moving images crossing the retina. At this point in our analysis, this is 
Myshkin’s fate. Coming into St. Petersburg, he says, “I have no experience 
of women at all” (14). After months in Russia, he still has none. 
III. The Final Crossroads: Engaging the World
Thus far, we have analyzed two crossroads on Myshkin’s and 
Alyosha’s respective paths—paths leading toward their contrasting fates. We 
have seen how each man views his world and how each views other specific 
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individuals in his life. In reality, these have been paths to potential incar-
nation. As Christ was to become actually incarnate in the world, so each 
Christ figure is to become incarnate in Dostoevsky’s narrative world. At each 
crossroads, the underlying question has been: will each Christ figure move 
toward becoming incarnate in his narrative world? Will each see the reality 
of suffering not only abstractly but also in embodied persons? 
Now, we arrive at the final crossroads on this path to incarnation. 
Will Alyosha and Myshkin fully enter the world? Possessing a view of reality, 
will they now engage in that reality? The previous crossroads focused upon 
each man’s perceptions; here we focus on their actions. We have seen the 
beginnings of each man’s interactions with others, Alyosha’s being more pos-
itive than Myshkin’s. However, at this third crossroads, each man ultimately 
decides who he will become—a man of action, or a man of dreams. 
The monastery garden is the site of Alyosha’s successful incarnation 
as a Christ figure. In Grushenka, Alyosha has glimpsed reality through the 
forging of a deep relationship. However, in her reality he has also witnessed 
pain. Upon his return to the monastery, we can understand Alyosha as 
confronting the question that has dominated his life since his return to Sko-
toprigonevsk. He has chosen the monastic path partly as a desire to escape 
from suffering; now, he must ask himself whether his entire life will be one 
of comfortable isolation. Father Païssy’s juxtaposed reading reveals that 
Christ’s first miracle occurred in Cana of Galilee; there, Christ had to decide 
whether it was time to make himself known to society and enter public life. 
Alyosha, perhaps, realizes that he, too, faces this choice. Clear, pure water is 
life-giving, but Christ chose to transform it into the more worldly and rich-
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er wine, which brought gladness to the world. Will Alyosha do the same? 
Alyosha’s dream represents a temporary relapse into a state of safe 
unconsciousness, yet even there, reality beckons in the form of a vision to 
which Alyosha responds. The stars offer him a future of contemplation. 
Casting aside that hope, however, Alyosha chooses instead to embrace the 
earth. He even kisses the soil—earthy actuality (not a painted portrait). 
Alyosha knows that with this embrace will come suffering; he weeps over 
the earth, and all who are in it, for he loves them. Yet in embracing the 
finite, he has also received the ecstasy of the infinite; the “vault of heaven” 
has entered his soul (Brothers 312). Like a Kierkegaardian knight of faith, 
he “makes the movement of infinity and [gets] finitude out of it;” he lowers 
his eyes from the skies in order to express the “sublime in the pedestrian” 
(Kierkegaard 70). Here, Alyosha has embraced the real and received the 
exaltation of dreams. Thus, when he rises up and leaves the monastery—
reflecting his dream of the risen Christ—he does so as a “resolute champion” 
(Brothers 312). A champion over his previous fear and voluntary blindness, 
he has indeed acquired a greater resolution and become the fully incarnate 
Christ figure that he will remain for the rest of the narrative. 
In contrast, the Yepanchin family’s dinner party is the site of 
Myshkin’s failed incarnation. Like Alyosha in the monastery, Myshkin 
stands on the edge, looking out upon a world that promises harm. Alyosha 
has made a deep connection with a person in that world—Grushenka—but 
Myshkin possesses no such connection; he is adrift. His situation hearkens 
back to his condition in Switzerland; as he stands in the corner of the party, 
observing this “grand festival,” he continues to fear that he will remain an 
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outcast (Idiot 446). As then, he continues to “comprehend nothing” (446). 
Myshkin has no suspicion of concealed undercurrents of ulterior motives, 
corrupt histories, secret hatreds. His eyes dwell on the “superb artistic 
veneer” of everything (564). He does not suspect that this veneer might 
cover the lid of a coffin, concealing stale, rotting air. Distracted by society’s 
golden façade, he fails to comprehend its essence. As Myshkin treats the 
women in his life, so he treats the world. 
Myshkin is, however, increasingly desperate to enter reality, to make 
a human connection. “Choked with goodness” at the beauty that surrounds 
him, he longs to embrace the world as Alyosha does (Idiot 572). He longs 
to experience “fusion with the supreme synthesis of life,” like the wholeness 
Alyosha finds (237). But when he attempts to engage the other party guests, 
he unleashes a boisterous diatribe against the Catholic Church and asserts 
the preeminence of the Russian Orthodox Church. He longs to know others 
and to be known, but when he opens his mouth, a torrent of nationalistic 
ideology emerges. Seeing society as a beautiful two-dimensional image, 
and approaching it in fear, he can only engage it with abstract ideas. Just as 
Myshkin treats God as an intangible concept or image, so he also treats the 
world. 
When Myshkin finally lapses into unconsciousness, the physi-
cal parallels the spiritual. Myshkin inwardly withdraws from reality, and 
his true self remains hidden from those who might know him. His inner 
nature—once only revealed through his understanding of God—is now 
being manifested in his interactions, first with specific individuals, and now 
with society. In his fear, Myshkin has seen only images and contributed 
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only ideas; he has thus failed to engage reality. The would-be “Christ figure” 
never becomes incarnate.
Yet, incarnate or not, Alyosha and Myshkin must complete the 
Christ narrative. 
IV. Gethsemane
Shortly before the crucifixion, Christ prays on his knees in the 
garden of Gethsemane. He beseeches, “My Father, if it is possible, may this 
cup be taken from me. Yet not as I will, but as you will” (Holy Bible, Matt. 
26:39). In this moment, Christ is determining whether or not he must bear 
the cross, suffering for the sake of love. Determining that he must, Christ 
then goes on to endure Calvary, dying by crucifixion; three days later, he 
emerges resurrected from the tomb. Toward the ends of The Idiot and The 
Brothers Karamazov, Myshkin and Alyosha enter their own gardens of 
Gethsemane. But while Christ determined whether or not to bear his cross, 
each Christ figure must decide how to bear it; for each, the cross is inevita-
ble. Each man’s decision in his “Gethsemane” determines the nature of his 
Calvary, and ultimately, his duration in the tomb. 
We can interpret Alyosha’s and Myshkin’s Gethsemanes as being 
the homes of Lise Khokhlakova and Nastasya Fillipovna, respectively. Here, 
Alyosha stands before Lise—the “little demon”—who bears fragments of 
their broken betrothal (Brothers 489). Myshkin, on the contrary, beholds 
not an aftermath but a potentiality, with two polar paths before his feet. 
He considers Aglaya, whose character promises consistent attachment, and, 
simultaneously, Nastasya, whose turbulent nature promises a flux between 
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intimacy and alienation. For Alyosha and Myshkin both, a crucial time of 
decision has arrived.
The decision that unites each of these scenes, such that both can 
be called “Gethsemane,” is the following: Christ asked for reprieve in the 
garden of Gethsemane. He did not want the cross; he wanted its redemp-
tive result. Suffering was not an end; it was a means to a greater end: love. 
In Dostoevsky’s Christ figures’ Gethsemanes, each must determine his own 
ultimate purpose. Will he bear the cross for the sake of love, or for the sake 
of suffering as a perverse end in itself? 
Alyosha, when he abandons his novice’s cassock, does so realizing 
that suffering accompanies love; with Lise, however, he realizes that suffer-
ing—simply for suffering’s sake—is not something to choose either. Alyosha 
desires to heal Lise of her anguish. As with Grushenka, he is “kenotically 
attentive” to her, humbly emptying himself so that he can receive her reality 
(Contino 69). He promises to always love and weep for her; the two actions 
will be inseparable, for his love of her tortured soul will cause him to suffer. 
He recognizes, however, that he cannot heal her tortured soul by marrying 
her. To do so, in effect, would be to marry her suffering—to chain himself 
to it. For it would be pity, not romance, that would bind Alyosha to Lise 
now. This urge of pity would ultimately dishonor her and destroy him. 
Here, unlike with Grushenka, it is distance, as opposed to proximity, which 
allows for love—love of both Lise and himself. In order to love both Lise 
and himself, he must stay whole, and commitment to her would require 
that he be torn asunder. For this reason, when forced out the door, he 
leaves. In effect, this final action begins Alyosha’s Calvary. Alyosha bears the 
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cross of Lise’s suffering, the natural consequence of his love for her. How-
ever, he does not choose to bear this cross in a way that will destroy him. 
He is a Christ figure, not Christ; he can accept the cross, but in order to rise 
again, he cannot cling to it.   
On the contrary, Myshkin plans to marry himself to the suffering 
Nastasya. Faced with a choice between a woman who offers simple love—
Aglaya—and a woman who offers passionate suffering—Nastasya—he 
chooses the latter. Here, Myshkin again falls prey to a kind of aesthetic 
“intoxication,” whereby he continues to pursue beautiful images (Idiot 614). 
Myshkin is seduced by others’ picturesque suffering. It is not only Nastasya’s 
beauty that holds him spellbound, but also the “great deal of suffering” in 
her face (85). His desire to witness suffering is partly driven by a kind of 
visceral urge to experience pain, and, ultimately, to see death, because death 
appears beautiful. This morbid passion for Nastasya, akin to Myshkin’s 
morbid interest in the Holbein, reveals a psychological pattern that will 
culminate in his ultimate end in Rogozhin’s house, with his final attraction 
to both the dead Nastasya and her murderer reflecting the novel’s earlier 
foreshadowing. 
But while Myshkin is enchanted by the aesthetic nature of suffer-
ing, he is not content simply to observe it; he wants to heal it. He is drawn 
to Nastasya as to a “pitiful, ailing child,” not unlike his earlier interactions 
with Marie in Switzerland (Idiot 624). Myshkin himself believes that he 
loves Nastasya out of “pity” and “compassion” (458), “not love” (218). 
But in order to heal this suffering, Myshkin oversteps the bounds of pity. 
Instead, he attempts to heal through suffering. This urge seems to be a strain 
61THE OSWALD REVIEW / 2019
of nadryv—a psychological phenomenon observed throughout Dosto-
evsky’s works. As Robert L. Belknap explains, “Nadryv has been rendered 
as ‘laceration,’ and is derived from rvat, to ‘rend,’ ‘tear,’ ‘burst,’ ‘split’… 
nadryv causes a person to hurt himself in order to hurt others, or, perversely, 
to hurt others in order to hurt himself ” (37-8). Edward Wasiolek further 
observes, “Nadryv is for Dostoevsky a purposeful and pleasurable self-hurt. 
. . . a primal psychological fact. It is the impulse in the hearts of men that 
separates one man from another” (160). Unlike typical nadryv, Myshkin 
has no intention of harming others; he does, however, have every intention 
of harming himself. His love is a kind of lacerative, romantic love, whereby 
he desires to help “the suffering” so much that he will undergo unnecessary 
suffering; this healing-by-nadryv goes well beyond what is required or even 
possible. 
Why choose to suffer? Myshkin mistakenly views suffering as his 
final opportunity for incarnation. On some level, he recognizes that incarna-
tion requires love. And he believes that suffering, in itself, will be the means 
to love. In Myshkin’s mind, if it does not hurt, it is not love. Thus, in a final 
act of desperation, he decides to tortuously indulge in suffering in order 
to enter and save the world. He chooses crucifixion, by itself, in order to 
achieve liberation from his perpetual loneliness. But suffering does not end 
Myshkin’s alienation; he wounds himself in order to heal others, yet, being 
wounded, he requires healing himself. Aglaya presents this opportunity to 
Myshkin. Aglaya offers a peaceful and intimate relationship, one that would 
free him from his solipsistic prison. Instead, he chooses to marry an incon-
stant and tormented woman. He bears a cross that will devour him. 
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The love of Christ that accepts suffering is Alyosha’s initial answer 
to Ivan’s challenge. In responding to Lise’s suffering, Alyosha embodies this 
response: he bears the cross of suffering out of love—choosing love and 
accepting suffering. On the contrary, Myshkin bears the cross in order to 
find love. As a result, he chooses suffering in itself, and denies love. Inflict-
ing suffering on himself—partly in an attempt to battle evil and suffering—
he actually compounds the problem of evil. For this self-inflicted suffering, 
too, may require a theodicy. In this attitude, one chooses the cross when 
offered a simpler and equally effective option. One chooses Christ in the 
tomb over Christ resurrected. This tomb is each man’s ultimate fate.
V. The Entombed Christ and the Risen Christ
Alyosha and Myshkin, having now accepted their crosses, reach 
Calvary. Arriving there, each re-discovers the problem of evil, but now in its 
real, incarnate form, the form in which it was embraced by Christ.  
At the funeral of Ilyusha, Ivan’s argument symbolically comes to 
life. Where before Alyosha philosophized about child suffering, he now 
stands in its presence. The twelve grieving children demand a response. 
Can Alyosha now offer an adequate response? This is Alyosha’s final test. 
Standing beside the stone under which Ilyusha was initially to be buried, 
Alyosha begins to encourage the children. “Let us remember his face, and 
his clothes, and his poor little boots,” he exhorts (Brothers 646). “Don’t run 
from reality,” he seems to be saying, “Don’t let grief drive you into forgetting 
your friend.” Even as he encourages them to face their current reality, how-
ever, Alyosha also urges them to anticipate a future reality, that of the life to 
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come: “Certainly we shall all rise again, certainly we shall see each other and 
gladly, joyfully will tell each other all that has happened” (646). Like Christ, 
Alyosha, the “resolute champion,” stands next to a stone under which no 
corpse resides. He brings hope to the myopic in the presence of the grave. 
And at the end of the novel, he walks out of the graveyard. The figurative 
Christ has entered the tomb and emerged again, bringing life to the twelve 
figurative disciples who surround him. 
Myshkin, too, enters a tomb: Rogozhin’s house. With the discovery 
of Nastasya’s corpse, the sepulchral element of Holbein’s painting has come 
to life, though the painting lacks its primary subject. Can Myshkin respond 
where he could not before? He cannot, and he remains entombed. Seeing 
such aesthetically beautiful suffering, he is mesmerized. Lured by the dark 
glow of this living portrait, he longs to be consumed by it, to become for a 
moment a brilliant, dancing ash. Thinking he is pursuing reality, Myshkin 
has always been preparing to return to the Holbein portrait. He leaves 
Switzerland like an image stepping from a frame. Yet he continues to see the 
world as an artwork, populated with beautiful images. He seeks to engage 
with picturesque pain through the emotional turmoil of self-inflicted suffer-
ing, but only becomes more distant. Ultimately, Myshkin’s final act is con-
sistent with this pattern. In the novel’s final scene, Myshkin strokes the face 
of Rogozhin, Nastasya’s murderer, and slips into insanity (Idiot 648). Thus, 
he becomes the subject of his own painting, the dead Christ of Holbein. 
In The Idiot and The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky sought to 
incarnate two Christ figures. One man—Myshkin—stands at a distance, 
beholding the world as a portrait that he both loves and fears. Ultimately, 
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this man chooses death for fear of life, and Dostoevsky returns him to his 
frame—a dead image. The other man—Alyosha—“falls to the ground” like 
a kernel of wheat (Holy Bible, John 12:24). Literally and figuratively, he 
kisses the earth, finding both seeds of faith and the ashes of suffering. It is 
for this realist embrace that, in the end, he rises as new wheat by the hand of 
Dostoevsky. 
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